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Reitner Res ponds to Elliott
By Bennett Keitner
NorthUJestern University
nto each would-be philosopher's life, it
would seem, some rain must fall.
Many if not most philosophers go
around with a psychic umbrella handy, given
that people foolhardy enough to publish to
the world their philosophical thoughts must
be ready to pay the consequences in having
to fend off the attacks of those who find
those thoughts not in congruence with their
own and therefore obviously deficient.
For over 20 years since the publication in
1970 of the first edition of A Philosophy 0/
Music Education (APME), I have dwelt
largely in sunshine. There have been a few
drizzles now and then but for the most part
my philosophical skies have seldom been
cloudy, and I have enjoyed the fact that tens
of thousands of music educators and others
have found the book useful, helpful, and
convincing. In one sense that's been delightful for me: who, after all, enjoys stormy
weather? But in another sense there has
been far too little philosophical discussion in
music education, and I have missed the pleasures of a lively community of colleagues
specializing in the kinds of ideas that intrigue
me, and with whom I could have shared the
benefits of stimulating debate. Because no
such community has existed our profession
has had little experience with the kind of intellectual interaction that elevates, enlightens,
and rejuvenates its participants. We have
instead been subjected to occasional downpours, such as the present one, in which
philosophical criticism is delivered with as
much finesse as a dumped bucket of water.
So to respond to Elliott I've had to whip
out my umbrella from the closet where it has
been gathering dust. In the case of Elliott
this is the third time I've had to grab for that
umbrella, so I'm getting pretty good at it.
The first time occurred when he submitted a
critique to The Quarterly and I was sent a
copy so I could respond. I immediately did
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so and mailed it in. Then, a second critique
by Elliott appeared in the Philosophy of Music
Education Neuisletter (2:1, October, 1989),
covering pretty much the same ground. So I
whipped out a second response, for the
Newsletter (2:2, March, 1990) Then, I was
told that Elliott had decided to "edit" the critique I had responded to for The Quarterly.
When I received it (the essay printed above)
it was some dozen pages longer that the
original, and, inexplicably, the most blatant
distortions and misconstruals I had pointed
out in my response to the original had been
papered over. So I'm now at it once more,
and readers will understand, perhaps, that I
am just a little bored and just a little disgruntled at the prospect. Nevertheless I feel
it is important to deal with tae matter again
because at least a few of the many philosophical tangles he presents continue to
need to be straightened out.
Elliott's present essay raises clearly a number of issues relating to intellectual criticism.
The attempt to criticize or assess another's
thought, as it has been embodied in a book
or essay, is inherently complex and fraught
with possible hazards. First, the critic must
thoroughly understand the work he or she is
dealing with, which is usually not entirely
possible. Second, extrapolations from what
an author has said need to be made, and
these can be in consonance with those the
author might make but can also veer off in
directions the author might not or certainly
would not have taken. They can even be
contradictory to what the author believes.
This can occur because the author has not
been entirely clear about the issues, leading
the critic down mistaken paths; or because
the critic, having his or her own axes to
grind, puts an author's ideas onto paths suiting the positions of the critic; or because, to
make critical points, the critic pushes the extrapolations in directions and to extremes
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"My entire point is that the classical point of view- of conceptualization and its association w-ith rrurid is be-corning obsolete,
allow-ing us, finally, to recognize rnusical thinking as genuinely
rriinclful."--Bennett Reirner
easily criticized. That is, an author's positions can be reduced to absurdity, or at least
illogicality, and then shot at for being absurd
or illogical.
I find, in Elliott's essay, all of the above hazards in full regalia. For some of his misconceptions and misapplications I think I am at
least partly to blame because I was not able to
be as clear as I would have liked to be, out of
my own weaknesses in thinking and writing.
In other cases the arguments he makes against
my views represent, simply, another way of
looking at the issues rather than a criticism, as
such, of my position on the issues. This is
perfectly acceptable and inevitable in a field
which consists entirely of a multiplicity of
views. Obviously we all feel our views are
correct or we wouldn't take them, but we also
recognize that our views are likely to be only
relatively correct rather than absolutely so (unless we think we're
apoleon) and that the
differences existing among views is what
makes for lively, fruitful debate.
Unfortunately, differences in view are often
not presented as such, but as combatants for
territory where, it is assumed, only one view
can possibly exist. I find many instances of
this also in the essay, and I regret it because
it would help all of us concerned about these
matters if alternative points of view were allowed to be just that, so we could ponder
the alternatives as a way to achieve progress
in our own thinking. Elliott seems driven to
throw alternative views against mine as if
they were in combat, when in fact they can
quite comfortably coexist as different and
sometimes complementary
ways to understand complex phenomena.
Finally, there is the situation of flat-out,
straight-ahead misrepresentation
or reductio,
and I regret to find so many of these in his
essay (one is too many) as to be bewildering,
both as to how to untangle all of them from
their convolutions, and as to why he gets
himself into them in the first place. This

68

Published by OpenCommons@UConn, 2021

gives criticism a bad name and we should
not be happy when it occurs.
I wish I could trace all the levels of critical
commentary in Elliott's essay through each instance in which they occur, but I'm afraid that
would make my response far longer than his
critique, would entrap the reader in a very
tangled conceptual (I dare to use that word)
web indeed, and would simply take too much
time. So I will choose a few issues to discuss,
hoping the reader will assess those I do not in
light of his or her understandings of my positions and of the efficacy of Elliott's critiques of
them.
First, and as a key to much that follows in
his essay, Elliott claims that philosophical
commitment is static, therefore likely to become obsolete eventually, and that our commitment requires regular rethinking. What
he is implying is that APME (this refers to the
second edition in question) represents a
static commitment on my part, that this commitment is in the nature of a dogma and
therefore must sooner or later become obsolete, and that we must then recommit ourselves to still another dogma which will then,
just as inevitably, also become obsolete.
This formulation is repugnant to my own
thinking, as evidenced by the magnitude of
growth and change from the first edition of
APME to the second one. But one thing I
did insist on keeping from the first edition
was my explanation of the hazards entailed
in using aesthetics in building a philosophy.
(T)he field of aesthetics must be approached in
a highly selective way. It would be beside the
point (and quite impossible) to investigate indiscriminately the writings of every aesthetician
in history, or every aesthetician of this century,
or every aesthetician alive today, looking for
leads to a philosophy of music education. Instead, the search must start with an acquaintance with the field of music education: its
problems, its needs, its history, its present status. Aesthetics must be used by music educators to serve their own purposes. Otherwise
they are likely to lose themselves in the history
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"When Reirner states that music is 'nonconceptual
'we

in essence',

rnust consider the possibility that his philosophy

offers a

ITlisleading vievv of the nature and value of rnusic and rnusic
cognition ... "--David J. Elliott
and problems of aesthetics, never to emerge
with a workable philosophy. A philosophy
should articulate a consistent and helpful statement about the nature and value of music and
music education. Only those portions of aesthetics useful for this purpose need be used.
Aesthetics must never be the master of music
education-it
must be its servant. Cp. 15)

Our commitment in formulating a philosophy of music education should not be to a
dogma, but to an ongoing process of clarification, and our rethinking should not be of
that commitment, but of the contents and issues we are trying to cope with. I've stated
this view often, in APME but also more recently: "Aesthetic educators need no discipleship to a particular person or point of view.
Instead, they seek compelling insights about
the value of music, organize those insights
into the most coherent and convincing philosophy they can, and try to use that philosophy as their guicle for teaching. Aesthetic
education, therefore, is not founcled on a
static, revealed body of truths and proper actions; rather, it is based on an attitude that
truth consists of a growing and changing
conjunction of carefully examined ideas
about what music is and does."!
The point of Elliott's comments about
philosophical commitment is precisely to set
up philosophizing as the posing of dichotomies that can only be resolved by one view
replacing another, and that accounts for the
tone of his essay as being an exercise in pitting views against one another. For example, Elliott makes a big to-do about the
fact that aesthetics is historically embedded
in particular sets of ideas and events. Of
course. But that says nothing about the reality of the growth of aesthetics far beyond its
ancient history, and its modern positions and
interests so transformed from their "fine art"
precursor ideas as to render those older ideas
hopelessly quaint. Elliott's quote about how
the nobility in eighteenth century Europe
used the "prestige function" of fine art to
Volume II, Number 3
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mark themselves off from the crowd, and his
other references to the social history of aesthetics, are about as germane to contemporary aesthetics, and to my own view of music
and music education, as eighteenth century
science is to contemporary quantum physics.
And it would come as a bit of a surprise to
the thousands of people laboring in aesthetics to hear that the incredibly diverse views
they represent are actually only a single concept about "fine art." That concept itself, and
issues relative to the intelligence of art-making, and issues of the functions of aesthetics
as a field, are all grist for the mill of conternporalY aesthetics, a mill grinding on and on
(sometimes to the dismay of someone trying
to keep up with it all). And in particular, the
nature of artistic functioning, including the
relation of craft to expressive form, are legitimate issues to be explored within the broad
realm of aesthetics. One of Elliott's citations
to "the recent philosophical literature of artistry" about which I am apparently unaware,
is, as a matter of fact, a doctoral dissertation
(Rao) on which I labored intensively and that
reviewed the literature exhaustively.
Elliott's discussion of aesthetics is representative of the way he treats many if not most
issues he addresses. He so narrowly and
specifically focuses his vision, concentrating
on this or that single dimension and its particular difficulties, that the larger issues never
emerge. Yet he is willing to dismiss whole
areas of thought because somewhere along
the way there are or were flaws. In the matter of aesthetics he concentrates on one aspect, neglecting the fact that, in the twentieth
century, as Ralph Smith reminds us,2 aesthetics includes not only the speculative branch,
which tries to synthesize (Dewey, Langer,
Goodman are examples) but the analytical,
which addresses a variety of aesthetic concepts (expression, criticism, style, etc.) in an
attempt to probe their complexities (Hospers,
Beardsley, Dickey, ete.) In addition, scien-

69
4

Reimer: Reimer Responds
tific aesthetics has become a major dimension of the field, with a host of studies in the
psychological branch (Munro, Arnheim,
Kreitler, Gardner), the sociological branch
(Becker, McFee) and the anthropological
branch (Berliner, Chalmers). (Many other
names could be added, of course.) But with
all this diversity of scholarship an underlying
premise remains persistent-that
the arts always have been, and remain, a source of a
special, satisfying way for humans to experience. As Hans and Shularnith Kreitler put it
in their Psychology of the Arts, "... what determines the value, estimation, fate, and survival of a work of art is in the last count the
experience it arouses in its perceivers. "3
Readers who systematically keep up with
important journals in aesthetics (The Journal of
Aesthetics and Ai1 Criticism and Tbejournal cf
Aesthetic Education are two basic ones), and
the ongoing flow of new books on philosophical dimensions of the arts, will be immediately
and keenly aware that Elliott's position about
the state of aesthetics represents a distinctly
minority view that is not at all in the mainstream of contemporary thinking. That thinking is very diverse and is spread along a continuum from, at one end, skepticism about
long-held views (the position he would like to
think is more central than it is) to the other
end which continues to probe the complexities of traditional views. In the mainstream is
the attempt to broaden understandings without
either abandoning the painstakingly built ideas
of this century or accepting them uncritically.
For readers not current about the aesthetics
scene today, I would strongly recommend a
look at two recent books that give a fair representation of the flavor of recent thinking. For
aesthetics as a field, the small book by Marcia
M. Eaton, Basic Issues in Aesthetics (Belmont,
California: Wadsw0l1h, 1988) is an excellent
overview. For aesthetics as related to education the new anthology edited by Ralph A.
Smith and Alan Simpson, Aesthetics and Al1s
Education (Urbana, University of Illinois Press,
1991) gives an excellent picture of the salient
issues. These, and a host of other recent publications, will give some perspective on the
particular view Elliott is espousing. But they
will not explain the narrowness or rigidity with
which he espouses it.
70
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In addition to the issue of what constitutes
a defensible aesthetic position, Elliott implies
that all functions and aspects and valuations
of art are to be given equal weight, and since
there are so many of each, no distinguishing
features of art or values of art can be identified as more central than others. But I am
far more persuaded by the essentialist challenge to probe for those conditions, or symptoms, or parameters, that help us understand
why we recognize art to be something other
things are not. We must recognize that other
periods of history than our own and other
cultures than our own have different belief
systems about music. (This is something I
believe should be taught to children as part
of music education-an
aspect we've neglected unconscionably).
But I am convinced that this does not exempt us from
ha ving and honoring our own system of beliefs and hying to clarify what those are.
That, I take it, is the use of philosophy, and
it is what engages me (and most other philosophers) in the enterprise. It is simply a
cop-out, I think, to utter a truism-s-that music
is a multidimensional, multicultural phenomenon-and
figure one has said something
useful. Something, after all, makes all that
stuff music, and the stimulation shared by
the thinkers who have pursued that elusive
quality is the joy of doing philosophy. The
pursuit will never end, of course, but each
culture, as it struggles to define itself, is obligated to engage in it.
Now a word about Susanne Langer, about
whom Elliott makes a great deal more than I
do in basing his rejection of an entire philosophical view on long since recognized and
often repeated inadequacies in her ability to
explain the relation between art and affect.
Langer must be spinning in her grave. I truly
feel sony for the calumnies heaped on her
over the years, and for Elliott's addition to that
pile. If there is anyone we should be grateful
to for pioneering work to free aesthetics from
Romantic, narrow, "expression of emotion"
theorizing, it is she. Her efforts were heroic,
and she got herself into all sorts of trouble for
being innovative, as, for example, in trying to
redefine how symbols work and having the
word thrown into her face, as Elliott continues
to do in his tortuous badgering of her seminal
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attempts to bring some clarity to the idea of
symbolic transformation. His serpentine arguments about how art cannot "symbolize" feeling without the feelings already being accessible, are dissolved immediately by Francis
Sparshott, who dismisses the issue by explaining that "According to her theory, it is just because the artist's (and other people's) repertory
of 'knowledge' of the possibilities of feeling is
not available as knowledge but exists as a sort
of empathetic capacity that art is necessary to
symbolize the modes of sentience. The conundrum that her critics pose for her, that we
cannot know that art does this unless we can
already recognize the symbolized modes of
sentience, so that the symbolization is unnecessary, is readily solved: all that we know is
that the work of art before us gives form to
some form of sentience; what form that is we
can say only by describing the work."?
The astonishing imaginativeness of
Langer's contribution, to say nothing of its
breadth of application to the specificities of
all the arts, opened major new avenues of
thought and also provided aestheticians with
opportunities to pick apart some of her imperfections. An apt retrospective on Langer
is given by Howard Gardner in his latest
book To Open Minds, 5 in which, in his description of his college education, he says:
By far the greatest impression was made on me
by the two books ... the Platonic dialogue The
Meno ... and the slim treatise Philosophy in a
New Key, in which the philosopher Susanne
Langer described the analysis of symbolic forms
that was becoming a dominant theme in modern Western epistemology .... Building upon
centuries of philosophical analysis, and drawing
as well on results from studies of human psychology (including even developmental psychology), Langer argued that the ability to traffic
in symbols-like words, pictures, diagrams, and
works of music-is the hallmark of human cognition. Moreover, while acknowledging that
mathematics differs from other forms of human
knowledge, she did not fall prey to the standard
Platonic (or Pythagorean) ploy of placing it
upon a unique pedestal. Instead, she put forth
a more balanced and humane view, where artistic forms of thinking are as valid as mathematicalor scientific forms: the difference lies in the
kinds of symbol used and the kinds of cognitive
process engaged by these symbols. I was particularly struck by Langer's analysis of music as
concerned, not with feelings per se, but with the
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"forms of feeling"-with the tensions, dynamics,
and contrasts that permeate our emotional existence but cannot be adequately or accurately
captured by words or mathematical symbols.
Perhaps this "formal" formulation explained the
powerful hold music obtains over so many of
us. Though I certainly did not appreciate all
the implications of Langer's work, I sensed an
important contemporary effort to layout the
vehicles of thinking and of the arts and-her
special twist-to base the analysis upon studies
of human behavior that had scientific status.

Langer's monumental struggles, with all
their missteps, dangling ends, and frustrating
circularities, helped set in motion a train of
scholarship pursued vigorously by hosts of
others since her time. Another thinker who
struggled (earlier) with many of the same
problems Langer tackled was John Dewey,
who, despite the brilliance of his contribution, which must surely be counted among
the most important in the history of aesthetics, left them unsolved, so that others have
had to pursue them further. The crux of that
pursuit, as I understand it, is to get closer to
something that, in APME (p. 130,131), I suggested may ultimately not be achievable-a
full explanation of the precise relation of the
sounds of music to our inward experience
of them. The issue was well put by St. Augustine CA.D.354-430) who said, "I realize
that all feelings of our spirit, in their various
dispositions, have their own modes in voice
and song, which are stirred up because of
some secret affinity with them."6
What precisely, is the secret of that affinity?
Of all the scores of writers throughout history
who have tackled this issue, Langer, I think,
was the most prolific in her suggestive prose
as to the nature of that relationship. But, of
course, ideas about it have moved on and
aestheticians and others since her time have
tried out, for starters, "arousal," "metaphor"
(in at least a half-dozen meanings), "morphology," "isomorphism," "exemplification,"
"embodiment," "indwelling," "figurative possession," "emotions functioning cognitively,"
"feeling vested and perceived," "experiential
structure," "collaboration," "possession," "archetypal contents," "essentic forms," "aesthetic images," "regional qualities," "fictive
character," "pure process," "humanly organized sound," "deep structure," "affective
consciousness," "image schemata," "psycho71
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"Elliott claims that I insist that a listener must not consider social ,
historical, moral, political, etc. concerns in music. This is patently
absurd ... " -- Bennett Reimer
physical embodiment," "subject-reflexive behavior," "autonomic nervous system arousal,"
"iconic mimicry," and, out of sheer frustration
with it all, "some freak in the human animal"
(Leonard Bernstein).
Elliott takes me to task for not being entirely clear about the matter. I confess my
guilt. I am not, unfortunately, the first person in history to have solved the secret St.
Augustine identified. So I settled for giving
a list (p. 52) of some of the ideas suggested
from the large, convoluted literature on the
subject. Of this I continue to be convinced,
as are the vast majority of scholars in the
present day literature: that music does relate
uniquely in some as yet undefined (or
undefinable) way to inner experience; that
we treasure that relation and (largely),
therefore, music; that music heightens the
quality of our lives by offering occasions for
creating and sharing inner experiences we
find satisfying, broadening, deepening, challenging; that such experiences occur in a
multitude of ways and settings ranging from
the concert hall to the street fair to the protest march to the worship service to the
crooning of a mother to her baby to the
rock concert to the harvest dance and even
to Grand Ole Opry: that the more that education helps people share such experiences
from a broader diversity of music and complexity of music the more such education
can be conceived as musically educative.
We can argue, on and on, the finest points
and most excruciating subtleties of the interface between musical sounds and human
experiences, but I find no reason whatsoever to await their (unlikely) resolution before suggesting that there are things we can
do as music educators to enhance the possibility of that interface taking place.
With these broad issues having been
sketched, I want to mention a few specifics
from Elliott's review that beg for a response.
He faults me for using as synonyms "aesthetic," "musical," "artistic." I was aware of
the hazards of doing this, but, wanting to
make the argument more accessible to those
thrown off by the word "aesthetic," compro72
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mised in that direction, and I explained why
I was doing so in the preface. Perhaps that
was a tactical error. But surely he must recognize that it was a tactic, because he goes
so far as to use as an argument against it an
example I myself use in the book to distinguish between the experience of nature and
of art (he uses the experience of a sunset-I
use the experience of a farm scene). He
concludes, exactly as I do, that what separates art from nature is the presence or absence of human agency and artistry. But notice that in his discussion of this point, he
uses as criteria for the experience of a sunset, or a painting, precisely those he has laboriously attempted to discredit in the previous pages of his essay-aesthetic
criteria.
"Any phenomenon, " he says, "natural or human-made, can be examined in terms of its
sensuous, formal, or 'beautiful' qualities. A
sunset, for example, can be looked at solely
in terms of its colors and so on." Having rejected standard aesthetic thinking in the preceding (and following) material, he blithely
employs it when it suits his purposes, ignoring the fact that he destroys his own argument in the process. (That argument, by the
way, is not so neatly supported by the references he cites, which deal in complexities far
beyond the unshaded view he offers.) His
assertion that "The weight of modern scholarship ... presents a major challenge to
Reimer's aesthetic concept of music" is simply preposterous, in that the "aesthetic concept" is not mine, of course, but represents,
as I have pointed out, the wide mainstream
of contemporary thinking about the arts, as
Elliott unwittingly demonstrates by his many
self-contradictions on this point sprinkled
throughout his essay.
In another misunderstanding, Elliott claims
that I insist that a listener must not consider
social, historical, moral, political, etc. concerns in music. This is patently absurd and
pushes the position I argue (and which I
give a diagram for on p. 28 as contrasted
with the diagram I do not agree with on
p.24) into an indefensible corner. I believe
that context is an essential aspect of the ex-
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" ... MEAEmaintains that all music everyvvhere ought to be approached by making 'external' considerations.

. . . subservient to

internal 'aesthetic qualities.'" -- David]. Elliott
perience of music (and all art). What I argue is that context by itself, separated from
its artistic use, is, so far, nonartistic. That is
a far cry from the formalism he imputes to
me-a position about which I am critical in
the book. (Formalists, of course, criticize
me for being overly critical of formalism.)
Elliott also so exaggerates my concerns
about the technical-critical aspects of music as
to suggest another absurdity-that I would regard a pianist's style or a violinist's vibrato as
"nonaesthetic" or "nonmusical." Really. Any
music educator living in this world knows precisely what I mean by my criticisms of an
overly technical approach to teaching music,
and I'm sure Elliott also knows what I mean.
He just can't resist throwing a few rabbit
punches.
[The following two paragraphs were written
in response to Elliott's original critique. His
present version changes several wordings
which I demonstrated to be misrepresentations. The basic points I make here remain
valid.]
Elliott's discussion about the status of music
as conceptual or nonconceptual starts usefully
and ends in a partial quote so blatantly misrepresenting my own view as to have shocked
me. In the book I suggested that, in order to
distinguish musical experience from those experiences dependent on the use of symbols in
their conventional sense, we should understand concepts to entail symbol use (I used
two standard definitions). This allows us to
contrast concepts and percepts. Percepts, I
suggested, are nonconceptual according to
how that term has traditionally been defined.
A clarinet tone is an instance of a perceptual
construct, and it performs in our mental structure as a "nonverbal cognitive unit" (Elliott's
term). As he correctly says, we must use such
units in listening to Beethoven's (or anybody
else's) music. (He is quite unaware when he
says this, of course, that he is completely contradicting his previous arguments about aesthetic experience and musical engagement and
"multicultural" criteria.) So we do not disagree
about all this, and my use of a traditional defi-
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nition of "concept" as a way to clarify the distinction that artistic thinking is mindful on its
own terms seems to me, despite his discomfort
with it, extremely useful.
His quote from Glucksberg, meant to be
critical of my view, is precisely the view I argue: "... neither the content nor the processes
of thought need be verbal." My position is
that thinking in art is genuinely mindful, rational, intelligent, logical, cognitive. To my dismay, Elliott quotes me as saying that the arts
"do not involve reasoning or intelligence or
the intellect or logic or rationality or even
thinking as these have been understood."
What he leaves out is the first part of my sentence, which says "No wonder subjects such as
the arts, which are nonconceptual in essence,
have been considered secondary or even
trivial in that they" (here his quote starts), and
then he leave out the last part of the sentence
which says (after "as these have been understood") "by this limited and outdated position
as to the nature of cognition." There are no
ellipses before or after his quote to indicate
that something was left out. What was left
out, of course, is the point that the traditional
understanding of how concepts work makes
the "basic" subjects in schools the conceptual
ones, and the arts have suffered greatly from
such thinking. I find it incomprehensible that
he criticizes me for not regarding musical experience as cognitive, when that is precisely
the point I argue (and have argued in may
other places in addition to APME).
What has not been done thoroughly yet, by
me or anyone else, is to explore the many insights and applications to practice in the burgeoning literature on cognitive diversity. As a
member of the planning committee of the 84th
NSSEYearbook Learning and Teaching the
Ways ofKnounng (985), (mentioned on p.ll
of APME), along with Elliot Eisner and Robert
J. Sternberg, I had the opportunity to help formulate a conception of multiple cognitions
resulting in a challenging set of essays covering the cognitive modes of the aesthetic, the
scientific, the interpersonal, the intuitive, the
narrative/paradigmatic, the formal, the practical, and the spiritual. While this book will not
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be the last word (it is, more likely, among the
first) it is an important step toward recognizing
that cognition has been too narrowly defined
as being conceptual, in the sense I define this
in APME, and that aesthetic cognition is a
bona fide way of knowing. This idea will be
taken further in an NSSE Yearbook I am coediting with Ralph Smith, which will focus on
the arts as cognitive (Tbe Arts, Education, and
Aesthetic Knowing, University of Chicago
Press, 1992). So when Elliott says I "embrace"
the classical view of a concept, and that this
view is becoming obsolete, he is turning me
around 180 degrees. My entire point is that
the classical view of conceptualization and its
association with mind is becoming obsolete,
allowing us, finally, to recognize musical
thinking as genuinely mindful.
Elliott's discussion of concepts terribly muddies the points I have tried to make. It also so
glosses over the positions of the sources he
quotes as to verge on misrepresenting them, in
that most are either not remotely discussing
the issues pertinent to my explanation or are
dealing with minute analyses of concepts underlying my general use of the term. For just
one example, Smith's analysis cited by Elliott
of "exemplar" representauons=-a "faded pair
of blue jeans" for "pants"-in no way contradicts my explanation. The reason I raised the
point about concepts in the first place gets
hopelessly lost. He has the temerity to point
out as a criticism that conceptual learnings influence musical experience. But he nowhere
mentions any of the curriculum work I've contributed which is heavily based on a conceptual organization of learnings precisely because concepts are such powerful learning organizers. I've gone to extraordinary lengths to
clarify, however, that verbal learnings are not
equivalent to musical experiences-they
aid in
getting us closer to the essentially nonverbal
experience music exists to provide. Unfortunately, the pervasive understanding in the field
of education is that cognitive functioning requires the use of concepts as verbal, symbolic
media-see
Bloom's Taxonomy, Cognitive Domain, as the best case in point. Because music does not essentially consist of verbal
conceptualizations music has not been understood as one of the "cognitive" (read "basic")
subjects. Now that we are beginning to argue
successfully that cognition consists of far more
than conceptualization as that term is massively understood, we would be "shooting
ourselves in the foot" not to take full advantage of that argument. (A helpful explanation
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of these matters is given by Elliot W. Eisner in
his article "On the Relationship of Conception
to Representation," Art Education, March,
1983, in which he explores the implications of
the fact that 'The identification of language
with the use of words, and words with thinking has, of course, undermined the place of
the arts in education .... ")
Based, ironically, on the traditional use of
concepts as a means of reference, Elliott raises
a dead horse from the grave to flog it aboutwhether music "refers" (that is, "acts as a symbol for" in the conventional sense) to feelings
and therefore whether Reimer is, therefore, a
closet "referentialist." This, I am sorry to say,
is just silly. That there is a relationship between sounds and experiences of them (still
undefined or undefinable as previously mentioned) has nothing to do with referentialism
as I painstakingly define it (even with a diagram). I do find it amusing that Elliott manages to accuse me of two entirely contradictory and, in my opinion, flawed views--formalism and referentialism-in
the same essay.
I must be doing something right.
Related, and similarly stretched to the breaking point, is the material about the question of
how music "educates" if it does not tell us
about something outside music. Well, the
point is that our experience of music is somehow (the great "somehow" we can't explain)
in the music and our engrossment in it. A
whole chapter (5) tries to explain this. And to
suggest that we would have to be constantly
engaged in listening to music to claim we have
"knowledge of' it surely is pushing things beyond seriousness. Such a view of knowing "is
peculiar at best; at worst, it defies logic and
common sense," says Elliott. I surely agree.
Do we have to be in a state of constant eros
for love to be a pervasive factor in our lives?
(Well, that doesn't sound too bad, actually.)
Do we have to be in spiritual communion as
in worship for spirituality to be an aspect of
our lives? Surely we are not so compartmentalized. Our wholeness includes all the diverse, particular experiences that occur in living, and the attempt to help each specific experience to be of higher quality according to
its kind is what we generally call "education."
That is why music education is unique even
though it is a member of a larger family called
alts education, and why music educates
uniquely even if it operates within the same
cognitive domain as the other arts. The arts, I
argue in the book, are not redundant. Each
allows us to achieve a kind of cognition.
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Taken together there are characteristics in
common among those cognitions. But there is
no such cognition "out there," separate from
that which each art affords uniquely. "Aesthetic cognition" and "aesthetic sensitivity" are
only concepts-that is, they refer to a class of
possible experiences. They do not constitute
those experiences. Elliott says that what I
want to improve is not musicianship, not musicality, not artistry, but aesthetic sensitivity.
What I argue, in fact, is that you can't improve
aesthetic sensitivity to music except by improving musicianship and musicality and artistry.
Ditto for sensitivity to any other art. Education
in each art uniquely contributes to the totality
of what all the arts offer. Leave one out and
you don't get what it has to give. I've been
saying this for more years than I care to remember, and it is not a little disconcerting to
read that a concept such as "aesthetic sensitivity" is so misconstrued or misrepresented as to
be made to substitute for the actualities out of
which it takes its meaning.
But having said all this I do confess that my
lifetime as a musician and music educator has
indeed colored my view of the arts. Langer's
position that an understanding of music is the
key to understanding how the other arts work
is one I find particularly compelling, and it
pervades every aspect of my philosophy. Colleagues in other arts education fields have
noted this, justifiably, and I am prepared to
live with this orientation and to defend it
philosophically. That's what I meant in saying
that "The position about art being taken in this
book is essentially a 'musical' one" Cp. 119).
As with other claims I make, Elliott twists this
one around severely. I could understand the
criticism that my musical orientation limits my
view of the other arts, but it is not possible to
understand the reverse. My philosophy, read
by people outside music education, clearly
presents a music education point of view extrapolated to arts education, and, as I say, I
accept that. What I find deplorable is to have
my point of view presented inaccurately, and
then to be criticized on that basis.
All these and other distortions (and there
are so many of them as to overwhelm the
valid clarifications) lead Elliott to conclusions
that seem to me unfortunate. "... APME,"
he asserts, "does not seem to provide a secure philosophical basis for the organization
and conduct of music education." Putting
aside the obvious fact that no single book
can possibly do that but can only contribute
toward it (and that he says not a word in the
Volume II, Number 3
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entire essay about the whole chapters I devote to the conduct of music education), I
would argue that our history gives evidence
contrary to his view. A great deal of what
has actually occurred in music education
over the past three or so decades (which
Michael Mark has suggested we call the period of aesthetic education)" has, in fact,
been conducted according to and understood
as being based upon principles stemming
from my work and that of many others who
share a more or less common philosophical
orientation (as Elliott recognizes in his introduction). So this philosophical view has exerted, to a higher degree than philosophy
ever has in the history of music education,
an important influence on how we have conceived of our profession and attempted to
conduct ourselves accordingly.
Our task now, I think, is to continue to be
open to changes in this philosophy that
would represent improvement. A great deal
has happened over the past dozen or so
years in aesthetics, education, psychology,
research, philosophy in general, some of
which I attempted to incorporate in my revision. But it would be impossible for anyone
person to do all that needs to be done in this
regard. The job is massive.
But it is precisely because so many new
ideas can be and need to be incorporated
that I believe this philosophical view is alive
and well. A philosophy begins to wither
when important new insights can find no
room in it. Contrary or alternative views are
not the issue-these
always exist and have
existed, of course, since the inception of this
philosophy in the late 1950s. Viability is a
function of growth potential. I have the conviction, about the philosophical orientation I
have tried to explain in APME, that it has
only begun to fulfill its potential. Elliott's critique reinforces that conviction.
Notes
1. Bennett Reimer, 'Music Education As Aesthetic Education:
Past and Present." Music Educatorsjournal; 75:6, February, 1989, p. 26.
2. Ralph A. Smith, "The Changing Image of A11Education."
'Ibe journal of Aesthetic Education, 21:2, Summer, 1987.
3. Hans Kreitler and Shulamith Kreitler, Psychology of the
A11s. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1972, p. 6.
4. Francis Sparshott, The T7JeolY oftbe A11.\~ Princeton:
Princeton University press, 1982, p. 321.
5. Howard Gardner, To Open Minds. New York: Basic
Books, Ine., 1989, p. 41,42.
6. M.T. Clark (Trans.), Augustine of Hippo: Selected Writings.
New York: Paulist Press, 1984.
7. Michael L. Mark, "A New Look at Historical Periods in
American Music Education." Council forResearcb ill
Music Education, Bulletin No. 99, Winter, 1989. ~

75
10

